Beyond a certain hour, the only games worth playing are those amenable to game theoretic models. Lo and behold, I should be up teetering near the crack of dawn with an economist intent on applying the stag hunt dilemma, a kind of assurance/trust/coordination game, to the rigors of modern dating. Far from being an expert, in fact, rather more of a dating dilettante for whom even the word seems like a slip of the tongue, I listened to his explanation in the hopes being struck by lighting or, at the very least, an appropriate revelation.
First articulated by none other than the kind, humane philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau in A Discourse on Inequality (yes, Gabriel, that is sarcasm you smell), the stag hunt dilemma starts with a story:
"If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple..."
When do our scruples restrain us from making the choice with the least desirable social outcomes? Is 21st century dating a matter of preempting unscrupulous action via the limbo of mutual suspicion? Or, does this merely prevent us from absorbing the costs of such action, since it practically guarantees that suspicion will eventually lead one party to defection?
Yes, of course, dear, the ideal outcome for both parties is mutual cooperation with no defection or unscrupulous action. Unfortunately, however, mutual cooperation is a Nash equlibrium-- the players can't do better, but they can do worse depending on defection of other players. And the temptation to defect connects fear and action when there is reason to disbelieve the "rationality" of the other player (i.e. "Doesn't he see that this is advantageous for both of us? That it couldn't get better? Wait a minute-- what if he doesn't see? Then he might decide to defect because he doesn't know any better. I can't wait around for him to defect because my opportunity costs will increase..." and so on).
The economist seemed very nonchalant about the dilemma's solution-- both parties must shoot off one of their legs so they can't chase the hare. How neat and clean and cauterizing that dating dilemmas should require self-mutilation. We go from Rousseau's story to a game where winning involves accepting a known loss. And the sun rises as the couples on my street fasten their thong chastity belts. Anything for love, or just anything to keep the loved one from amassing a more impressive stag collection.
